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of specifications and measures of the tax variables. Measured effects are small, however,
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One of the most basic distortions created by the double taxation of corporate income
is the disincentive to incorporate. However obvious this distortion may be, most papers
investigating the distortions created by the corporate tax have taken as exogenous a firm's
choice whether or not to incorporate, assuming for example that some industries are in-
herently corporate while others are inherently noncorporate. A variety of nontax factors,
described below, can certainly influence a firm's choice of organizational form, causing
some to favor incorporating and others not. But are these nontax factors so dominant
that taxes do not in practice influence a firm's choice of organizational form? As Gravelle
and Kotlikoff (1989) emphasize, tax-induced changes in firms' choices of organizational
form in principle can create large excess burdens. The size of these distortions in practice
depends on the extent to which firms respond to these tax incentives.
In this paper, we calculate how the tax distortion discouraging firms from incorporating
has varied over time, then estimate the extent to which the allocation of assets and taxable
income between corporate vs. noncorporate forms of organization has shifted in response
to this time-varying tax distortion. We do this using aggregate data, by industry, in the
U.S. during the period 1959-86. -
In theory, taxes should induce profitable firms to shift out of the corporate sector when
the tax distortion to incorporating is larger, and conversely for firms with tax losses. Our
empirical results provide strong support for these theoretical forecasts, and hold consis-
tently across a wide variety of specifications and measures of the tax variables. We also
found that some of the major non-tax-rate policy changes caused shifts in the predicted
We are grateful to Laura Kalambokidis, Linda Burilovich, Sharon Parrott, David Eaton, Tracy
Hudson, Steve Pincus, Bill Boyle from the IRS, and especially Jane MacKie-Mason for assistance in
creating the data set for this paper. We have had helpful discussions with Joel Slemrod and Mark Wolfson.
Financial support for the data collection was provided by the Office of Tax Policy Research and the
Rackham Graduate School at the University of Michigan. The paper was written while MacKie-Mason
was a National Fellow at the Hoover Institution.
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directions between C and S corporations, and among S corporations, partnerships and
proprietorships.
All measured effects are small, however, throwing doubt on the economic importance
of tax-induced changes in organizational form. For instance, cutting the tax rate on
noncorporate income by .10 is forecasted to cause no more than one-half of one percent of
total assets to shift out of corporate form. The effect is larger for the location of taxable
gains and losses, with the same tax change leading to a shift of approximately 5% of gains
and losses toward the more favored forms of organization.1 Overall, nontax determinants
of organizational form do appear to dominate, though further research will be needed to
determine which factors are most important.
The organization of the paper is as follows: In the first section, we examine theoretically
how the tax law distorts a firm's choice of organizational form. Not only do tax rates differ
by organizational form, but a variety of other tax provisions can also affect a firm's choice.
We also briefly discuss some non-tax factors that are believed to affect the choice of
organizational form.
In the second section, we present the results of our empirical analysis. In particular,
we examine the movement of economic activity across organizational forms in the U.S.
as tax rates and other tax rules have changed during the period 1959-1987. Our two
primary measures of economic resources and activity are book assets and net income. We
emphasize that it is important to distinguish between firms with positive income and firms
with losses; this distinction is important because many of the incentives are opposite for
gain and loss firms. We also examine how several changes favorable to the S corporate
form of organization have affected firm behavior.
1. Theoretical Framework
1 We have not yet estimated the implied excess burden created by the tax distortion to firms' choice of
organizational form, however.
1.1 Model of a Firm's Choice of Organizational Form
We begin with a simple model that determines the equilibrium allocation of resources
across different organizational forms as a function of tax rates and other non-tax factors.
For now we leave "other factors" largely unspecified; we return to them in section 1.3.
For simplicity, we allow for only two classes of ownership: one that is taxed at both the
corporate and personal level ("corporate") and another that is taxed only at the personal
level ("partnership"). The double-taxation of corporate income has been the focus of
studies of dividend payout behavior and corporate debt/equity decisions; we shall examine
its role in the determination of ownership structure.
In comparing the tax burden on different organizational forms, we begin by examining
the optimal debt/equity structure within each organizational form, since the total tax
plus nontax burden on each organizational form depends on the firm's financial policy.
Then, having determined the cost of taxes and other factors on the optimally financed
firm organized in either corporate or partnership form, we can determine the equilibrium
allocation of firms between the two forms.
We begin with the effect of U.S. corporate-level taxes on the financing of corporate
assets. Interest payments but not dividends are deductible under the corporate income
tax, implying that a shift of a dollar from equity to debt finance lowers corporate tax
payments each year by rci, where re is the corporate tax rate and i is the nominal interest
rate. This tax savings from additional use of corporate debt would be traded off with any
nontax costs that arise from the increased risk of bankruptcy.2 Following convention, we
express the total costs that arise from the threat of bankruptcy by C(Dc/V), where Dc/V
is the corporation's debt/value ratio. We assume that C(0) = 0 and that C(-) is convex.
The nontax cost of substituting a dollar of debt finance for a dollar of equity finance is
then C'(Dc/V)/V.
2 Financial distress costs are presumed to include not only administrative bankruptcy costs but also a
variety of extra monitoring and agency costs arising from the conflicts of interest between different classes
of creditors in bankruptcy, and even in the anticipation of the possibility of bankruptcy. See, for example,
Warner (1977), Myers (1977), Jensen and Meckling (1976), Bulow and Shoven (1978) and White (1980,
1989).
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Corporate income is also taxed at the personal level. 3 Under the personal income tax
nominal debt income (interest) is fully taxed at ordinary rates, while equity income is
partially taxed at ordinary rates (dividends) and partially at lower rates (capital gains).4
The specific tax rates, of course, vary by investor. However, as shown for example in
Gordon and Bradford (1980), when both a firm's debt and equity are traded freely in the
financial markets, without constraints, then the implicit personal tax rates affecting firm
behavior can be expressed as a weighted average of the tax rates faced by each individual
investor. Let Tp represent the implicit personal tax rate on interest income, and let re
represent the implicit personal tax rate per dollar of income to equity, taking as given the
division of this income between dividends vs. capital gains.5 If a corporation owns an asset
earning i before tax, and finances this asset by debt, then no corporate taxes are due on
the resulting net income, but personal tax liabilities equal rpi. If the asset were financed
instead with equity the corporate tax liabilities would be rei, leaving net of corporate tax
income of (1 - re)i to be received by equity holders. The shareholders pay tax at a rate
Te on this income, implying total tax payments of (rc +(1 - rc)Te)i under equity finance.6
If additional debt is used to finance the firm until the net tax savings that result are just
offset at the margin by additional bankruptcy costs, then in equilibrium
ductible. Let the implicit personal tax rate on the net earnings of this noncorporate firm
be expressed by r,,. Thus, on an asset earning i before tax that is equity-financed the
owner pays rni in taxes. In contrast, if this asset had been financed with debt, the owner of
the asset would owe no taxes but the lenders would face an implicit tax rate of r,, implying
tax payments of r,i. As long as r. > rp, as would be expected, these firms would also face
a tax distortion encouraging debt finance, implying that debt finance would be preferred
until the resulting tax saving is just offset at the margin by any nontax costs of the extra
debt. As before, let H(D,/V) represent the total bankruptcy-related costs faced by this
firm, when its debt/value ratio is D,/V, where H(-) satisfies the same conditions as C(-).8
The noncorporate firm should finance with debt to the point at which the marginal nontax
costs just offset any tax savings from extra debt finance, implying that in equilibrium
(T. - Tp)i = H'(D,/V)/V. (2)
(Tc + (1 - rc)rc - r,)i = C'(Dc/V)/V. (1)
In contrast, the earnings of partnerships (and sole proprietorships and S corporations)
are taxed only at the personal level with interest payments on debt financing fully de-
3 The analysis would be different in its particulars for a fully or partially integrated system such as one
finds in the United Kingdom, but the qualitative result that there are differential taxes across organizational
forms still holds.
4 Although the U.S. 1986 Tax Reform Act abolished the capital gains exclusion so that realized gains
would be taxed at ordinary rates, there is still a tax advantage from deferral since gains aren't taxed until
realized. In any case the equalization of dividend and capital gains tax rates appears to be short-lived:
the U.S. 1990 Budget Act begins to erode this by introducing a capital gains tax rate ceiling of 28% versus
a maximum ordinary marginal tax rate of 32%.
5 Given the continuing puzzle concerning why firms pay dividends, we do not attempt to model this
choice explicitly.
6 If the asset earned more than i, with the additional income accruing to the original equity holders,
then the same amount of taxes would be paid on the additional income, regardless of the choice of debt
vs. equity finance at the margin.
Should the firm choose to incorporate? Assume that the firm, if it does not incorpo-
rate, would earn I before taxes, interest deductions, and any bankruptcy-related costs.
Denote its taxable income, before interest deductions, by I.. If the firm incorporates,
its earnings, again before taxes, interest deductions, and any bankruptcy-related costs,
can be expressed by I + g, where g captures any nontax factors which make a corpo-
rate form of ownership more attractive (g can be negative, and will vary by firm).10
For simplicity, let the corporation's taxable income equal I + g, implying that the same
definition of taxable income is used for corporate and noncorporate firms, and that the
For a sole proprietorship, this tax rate simply equals the marginal tax rate of the sole proprietor. For
firms with several owners, r~ will equal a weighted average of the tax rates of each of the owners. Given
the differing "clienteles" for ownership shares in noncorporate firms vs. for debt, r~ can differ from rp,
and will normally be greater than rp - ownership of real capital becomes relatively more attractive than
debt as an investor's tax rate increases.
8 Given the lack of limited liability in many forms of noncorporate firms, and given the differing agency
problems faced by closely-held noncorporate firms vs. publicly-traded corporate firms, the function II(.)
will differ from the function C(.).
9 For simplicity, bankruptcy-related costs are assumed to be nondeductible.
10 As discussed below, corporations have the advantage of limited-liability and the possibility of public
trading of shares.
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tax law correctly measures the extra income, g, generated by incorporation. If the firm
incorporates, the net income received by equity and debt holders together is therefore
I + g - rpiDe - (I. + g - iDc)(rc + (1 - re)re) - C(De/V), while if it does not incorpo-
rate this net income would be I - riD, - (I. - iD,)ra - H(D,/V). The net cost from
incorporating therefore equals
-g(1-Tc-(1-Tc)rc)+(I, -iDc)(rc+(1 -Tc)Te -)+i(D,-Dc)(Tr-T)+(C- H). (3)
In general, this expression (and each of its four terms) can be of either sign. To begin
with, theory tells us little about the sign or size of g - all we can say is that the greater
the nontax advantage of the corporate form of ownership, the more likely the firm will
incorporate. In addition, (rc +(1 - rc)re -ro) and (I,. - iDe) can both be of either sign."
As expected, profitable firms should prefer that form of organization facing the lower tax
rate, while unprofitable firms should prefer to face the higher tax rate. In addition, if
firms have losses during some periods and profits during other periods, then in principle
they should change organizational form at the transition point. Similarly, if part of a firm
generates negative taxable income while the rest of the firm earns profits, then the firm
should try to sell off whichever part is not being taxed at the appropriate tax rate, so that
each part can choose the more advantageous organizational form.
The last two terms in the equation capture the effects of differences in use of debt, and
any resulting differences in bankruptcy-related costs. Again, theory does not help us sign
these terms, at least if the functions C(-) and H(-) differ arbitrarily.
Equation (3) describes the incentives faced by any given firm. Each of the parameters
in this expression can differ by firm, leading some firms to prefer to incorporate and others
to remain noncorporate.
Given the available data, we are not in a position to examine differences in the choices of
organizational form made by firms with different characteristics. Instead, we have data only
1 (Is - iDe) can be negative for a variety of reasons. First, even if its ex ante value were positive, its
ex post value could be negative. Second, for multiperiod investments, expected taxable income could be
negative in some years and positive in others. Third, even if the real income to equity were positive, this
expression equals the real income to the firm minus the nominal income to debt. Finally, even if (I - iDc)
were positive, (Ix - iDc) could be negative due to the effects of accelerated depreciation, etc.
on the time series for the aggregate division of firms between corporate vs. noncorporate
forms of organization. In general, the outcome in any year can be expressed as a function
of the joint distribution of each of the variables entering the expression. We will focus
specifically on the effects of changes in the second term in this equation. In particular, we
examine the effects of changes in the average value of (Tc + (1 - Tc)Te - T) each year on
the division of firms between corporate vs. noncorporate forms of organization, expecting
to find opposite effects of variation in this expression on the choice of organization form
made by firms with positive vs. negative taxable income.
In subsequent work, we will explore other testable implications of the theory. To be-
gin with, changes in the variability of (rc -- (1 - r) - .) across investors, holding its
average value constant, as for example occured in 1986 with the reduction in the num-
ber of brackets, has predictable effects on the distribution of firms across organizational
forms. Similarly, changes in the aggregate value of (Iz - iDe) should affect the observed
distribution, holding tax rates constant. Since theory forecasts that corporate debt/equity
ratios depend on basically the same poorly measured tax expression, one alternative test
would be to examine the degree to which debt/equity ratios and the chosen pattern of
organizational forms move together over time in the way forecast by the theory. Finally,
the theory forecasts that noncorporate investors with Tn > re + (1 - TC)Tc will own firms
generating tax losses, and conversely, a forecast testable with panel data sets on individual
tax returns.
Testing the effects of changes in the other three terms in equation (3) is much more
difficult. Theory tells us little about the determinants of g. Differences in the use of
debt by corporate vs. noncorporate firms would be very difficult to measure, given the
flexibility noncorporate owners have concerning where in their tax return the resulting
interest deductions can be reported. Similarly, measuring any systematic differences in
bankruptcy-related costs, arising from differences in organizational form per se, would be
virtually impossible given the available data.
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1.2 Tax Effects Other Than Tax Rates
The above discussion focused primarily on differences in tax rates affecting different or-
ganizational forms. However, there are a multitude of other tax provisions that differ
by organizational form. We summarize briefly some of these other tax provisions,1 2 even
though we are in a position to estimate the effects of only a few of them in the empirical
work.
Rules Governing Election. A business must satisfy some restrictions in order to avoid
corporate taxes. Often, for example, firms that are legally organized as partnerships are
required by the IRS to pay corporate taxes. In general, a firm will be taxed as a cor-
poration unless it fails two of the following criteria: (1) continuity of life; (2) centralized
management; (3) easy transferability of ownership shares; (4) limited liability.' 3
A firm that is deemed to be a corporation under the criteria above can still avoid
the corporate-level tax if it qualifies for S corporation status. The main criteria for S
corporation eligibility are: (1) no more than 35 shareholders; (2) no corporate shareholders;
(3) not part of an affiliated group; (4) only one class of stock; (5) and not a domestic
international sales corporation (DISC). The rules governing eligibility for S corporation
status have changed frequently since S corporations were created in 1957; we will be
examining the effects of a number of these rule changes in section 2.
Pensions and Fringe Benefits. Opportunities for tax-deferred savings and fringe ben-
efit deductibility have varied across organizational forms and over time. For example,
partners and sole proprietors can use individual-oriented qualified savings plans such as
Keogh accounts. Corporation pension funds have different rules on deduction limits and
other characteristics. For about fifteen of the past thirty years, S corporations have been
able to utilize Keogh-like plans; the rest of the time they have been subject to the same
pension restrictions as C corporations. On the other hand, more fringe benefits provided
12 For a richer discussion see Scholes and Wolfson (1987,1988,1991).
13 For much of the 1980s it was possible to form a master limited partnership that had most of the
characteristics of a corporation, including limited liability for the partners and publicly-traded ownership
shares, yet was taxed as a partnership. However the U.S. 1987 tax law instituted rules that require nearly
all master limited partnerships be taxed as corporations.
to employees are deductible for corporations than for partnerships and sole proprietorships
(including, until 1986, health insurance premiums). Again, S corporations have faced both
corporate and personal tax treatment of fringes at different times.
Loss Offsets and At-Risk Rules. One significant advantage for partnerships and sole
proprietorships is the ability to offset business losses against other sources of personal in-
come when figuring tax liability. If losses exceed other personal income they may be carried
forward against future income. A C corporation can offset losses only against its own past
or future profits - losses can offset profits in any of the prior three years, or be carried
forward without interest to offset future profits. The number of years before loss carryfor-
wards expire has changed over time for all organizational forms. Before 1983 S corporation
losses faced a third set of rules. Losses flowed through to the shareholders and could be
offset against other sources of personal income, but no carryforwards were permitted and
any unabsorbed losses were lost forever. Since 1983 S corporations shareholders may carry
losses forward for the same number of years as partnerships and C corporations.
In 1976 "at-risk" rules were applied to partnerships, restricting loss deductions to
the amount for which an investor is personally at risk. These rules were a response to
the growing use of schemes that leveraged limited partner investments in order to sell
large tax losses to high tax rate investors who could immediately deduct them during the
early years of a partnership while deferring taxes on gains until years later (when they
were taxed at the usually lower tax rate of the at-risk investor). These schemes were
particularly prevalent for real estate and leasing deals that took advantage of depreciation
and interest deduction rules. The at-risk rules were applied to S corporation shareholders
beginning in 1978.
Passive and Foreign Income. Before 1982 S corporations were not allowed to earn pas-
sive or foreign-source income, while other organizational forms were not so restricted.
With the U.S. 1986 Tax Reform Act passive losses accruing to partners and S corporation
shareholders could be offset only against other sources of passive income and not against
ordinary income. Beginning in 1972 a C corporation could receive favored tax treatment
on export business if it qualified as a Domestic International Sales Corporation (DISC). S
corporations have never been allowed to obtain DISC treatment.
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Reorganization Consequences. There are at least three ways in which economic re-
sources can move from one form to another; through a reorganization of an existing firm,
through entry of new firms, or in the case of a change from C to S corporation status sim-
ply through a declaration to the IRS without legal reorganization. The tax consequences
of these avenues for economic mobility differ. For example, when a C corporation wants
to convert to a pass-through form (i.e., S corporation, partnership or sole proprietorship)
it faces recapture provisions for the recovery of certain tax benefits if it reorganizes as a
partnership, but not if it elects S corporation status (if eligible to do so). Recapture is
not an issue for a newly-formed firm. Thus the mobility of resources will depend on the
extent to which an industry is growing, as well as on the amount of previous tax benefits
subject to recapture. Since the provisions for investment tax credits, research and develop-
ment credits, and accelerated depreciation have changed several times over the past three
decades the tax barriers to mobility across forms will have changed as well.
Capital Gains Provisions. In general, capital gains are taxed more favorably at the
personal than at the corporate level, creating an incentive not to incorporate for firms
earning substantial income in the form of capital gains. However, under the General
Utilities doctrine C corporations could separately incorporate an asset before it was sold
and then distribute the liquidation proceeds directly to shareholders without incurring
capital gains tax at the corporate level. This provision was repealed in 1986, however.
When the capital gains tax rate is low enough, relative to the ordinary tax rate, then
firms may have an incentive to churn assets. When an asset is sold, capital gains taxes must
be paid on the book profits, but the asset can then be depreciated based on the new book
value. The lower the relative value of the capital gains tax rate, the more likely this trans-
action is to be profitable. Churning can occur for firms as a whole, through acquisitions
and deacquisitions, or can occur for particular assets, e.g. buildings, airplanes, computers,
etc. Churning of particular assets would normally require, however, that the asset not be
firm-specific, so that the market can easily set an objective value. The opportunities for
profitable churning have varied over time - since 1986, they have basically disappeared.
Since "churned" assets would normally generate tax losses, profitable corporations would
have had the incentive to shift ownership of "churnable" assets to high-tax-bracket non-
corporate investors during periods when churning was profitable.
A related provision (Section 1374) was enacted in 1986 that provides sharply different
incentives to new firms and existing C corporations that are considering the choice of S
corporation status. Under Section 1374 firms that convert to S status must pay tax at
the top corporate rate on any "built-in gains" realized during the 10 years following a
conversion. This was designed to prevent firms from switching to S status just before
liquidation to avoid corporate-level capital gains taxation.
Alternative Minimum Tax. C Corporations face an alternative minimum tax (AMT)
when taxable income is low due to substantial tax preference items, but for many years this
AMT has not been binding on more than a few firms. Pass-through organizational forms
were not subject to this corporate AMT. In 1986 a much stronger AMT was legislated. S
corporations are not subject to this tax which will be especially important for firms with
substantial tax deferrals and accounting practices that lead to large book income relative
to taxable income because the AMT includes 50% of that difference in the alternative tax
base. However, a new personal-level alternative minimum tax was also instituted in 1986
and will be especially important for tax shelter investors with substantial passive losses.
Summary. It should be clear from this brief review that there are numerous tax rule
differences that are not easily captured in the formulation of equation (3) but should affect
the allocation of economic resources across organizational forms. In our empirical analysis
we exploit the fact that a number of these provisions have changed during our sample
period, providing us a limited opportunity to test for their effects.
1.3 Non-Tax Factors
In the derivation of equation (3), we introduced a nontax advantage, g, to the corporate
form of organization, without attempting to explore what factors affect its size or sign.
There are a number of potential stories that might be told concerning the source of this
parameter g. However, these stories have not been developed formally in the existing
literature, and we do not attempt to do so here. Instead, we simply describe briefly some
of these stories and how we dealt with them in our empirical analysis.
Limited Liability. One obvious distinction is between limited liability for corporate
shareholders and unlimited liability for partners and unincorporated sole proprietors. Upon
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careful examination, however, it is not very clear what role liability plays in determining
the allocation of resources across organizational forms.
There appears to be a rough corollary to the Modigliani-Miller Theorem that holds for
liability and the choice of organizational form: through recontracting it appears possible
to undo most of the distinction imposed by formal legal rules, thus rendering limited
liability irrelevant, or at least not obviously the dominant distinction between corporate
and partnership structures. For example, it is very common that the shareholders of small
corporations with low collateral must pledge personal assets if they wish to obtain external
bank financing. A partnership, on the other hand, could write liability limits into contracts
with its lenders, suppliers, customers and so forth.
The legal difference in the default provisions concerning liability for corporate vs. non-
corporate firms is therefore important only to the degree to which explicit recontracting
imposes transactions costs - in some cases, these costs will be large enough that the less
favorable rule is left in place. Differences in these provisions are therefore more important
when contracting costs are larger.
Even when contracting costs prevent differences in default liability provisions from
being undone by explicit contract provisions, it is still not clear whether making limited
liability the default provision for corporations favors the corporate form of organization. To
the extent that equity holders are better informed than debt holders concerning the future
prospects for the firm, then limited liability exacerbates problems created by principal-
agent between equity holders and bond holders when firms try to borrow. Conversely
if existing shareholders have private information about the firm's potential liabilities (or
future prospects) not available to new shareholders, then limited liability can lessen the
lemons problem when shares are sold to new shareholders.
Another complication is that in some cases a firm can be taxed only at the personal
level, yet still have limited liability as the default provision. One clear example would
be subchapter S corporations. Another is limited partnerships. In a limited partnership
only the general partner-who may own no more than 1% of the equity capital-need
bear unlimited liability, while the limited partners are liable only to the extent of their
investment, the same as corporate shareholders. In fact, the general partner can even
be a corporation, which bears general liability but only to the limit of the corporation's
wealth, with no further recourse to the corporation's shareholders. Although it does appear
possible largely to undo the limited liability distinction through this vehicle, there are
hidden information and moral hazard costs that arise from the limited partnership form
because the limited partners are not allowed to directly participate in management in order
to obtain partnership tax treatment.14
Finally, owners facing unlimited liability may be able to buy insurance protecting them
against these losses, so that they effectively have limited liability. For example, in response
to restrictions on passive loss deductions (including limited partner losses) in the U.S. 1986
Tax Reform Act some firms that had previously formed limited partnerships began offering
general partnerships to generate active losses, but simultaneously offered liability insurance
to all of the investors who ordinarily would be limited partners. However, the investors
were still exposed to the residual risk in the case of an extreme liability claim that exceeded
the limits of the insurance.
The role of limited liability in determining the allocation of resources across organi-
zational forms is too unsettled in the theory for us to completely control for it in our
empirical analysis. However, most of our empirical tests are based on time-series variation
in the tax costs for different organizational forms. It seems plausible that the costs and
benefits of limited liability have been relatively constant over time, or at least did not co-
vary systematically with legislated changes in tax costs. Thus, we may have a valid ceteris
paribus experiment.
Public Trading of Shares. As noted above, another distinction between C corporations
vs. other organizational forms is the public trading of shares. This is another area in
which the theory is not well-developed. There seem to be at least two real consequences
to consider. First, it is widely agreed that publicly-traded firms have access to lower-cost
equity capital. Second, publicly-traded shares may provide an important instrument for
the amelioration of asymmetric information problems between managers and owners. This
second point bears some discussion.
14 Some moral hazard costs of limited partnerships are considered in Wolfson (1985); MacKie-Mason
(1987) examines some hidden information costs.
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The divergence between the interests of owners and their agents is well-known and
much studied. A central problem is the design of incentive compensation schemes that
attempt to align the managers' interests with those of owners. In principle, a manager's
compensation should be tied to his contribution to the value of the firm. Given that this
contribution is not normally observable directly, firms in practice try to tie the manager's
compensation heavily to the firm's share value, via share-purchase pension plans, stock
options, etc., as documented for example in Murphy (1988). The share value used in
determining compensation should be based on an objective and external measure of value
that is not subject to manipulation. A stock market should produce such an objective
valuation, but presumably an outside accounting firm could also do a reasonable job. In
principle, this outside valuation is needed only once for each manager, when the manager
leaves the firm, as for example occurs for a sole proprietor when he sells his business. For
a business of any size, however, in which many of the top managers will have their pay
tied to share values, these departures occur regularly. Obtaining careful outside valuations
in each case would be very costly, making it valuable to have such a valuation continually
available through the firm's share price in the stock market. At least large firms should
therefore find the option to have their shares publicly traded to be of great value. It is
certainly the case that large firms are much more likely to incorporate than small firms.
In some cases, noncorporate firms have also been able to trade their ownership shares
publicly. For example, during much of the 1980's shares in master limited partnerships
could be traded publicly.
In the empirical work, we rely on the assumption that the value of public trading of
shares, and the size distribution of firms, has not changed much over time, or at least not
in a way correlated with tax cost changes.
2. Empirical Analysis
In this section, we estimate the degree to which various aggregate measures of the allo-
cation of resources and economic activity across organizational forms has responded as
expected to changes in tax incentives. We rely on U.S. tax return data made public by
the IRS. Individual business tax returns are not available, so we are not able to estimate
microeconomic models of discrete choice among the different organizational types.
2.1 Overview and Data
We use data covering the period 1959-1986. The data were collected from numerous IRS
publications and data tapes, and were carefully checked for accuracy. Details are given
in the appendix. We have measures on about a dozen income statement and balance
sheet items as reported to the IRS for C corporations, S corporations, partnerships and
sole proprietorships. We have data for 7 industry aggregates that correspond to the SIC
1-digit aggregates.15
For net income, losses and some other variables we have separate data for firms with
positive net income and firms with losses. Unfortunately, the IRS does not split asset data
by profit and loss firms for all organizational forms. The distinction between gain and
loss firms is especially important for the net income data. As we discussed in section 1,
firms have an incentive to allocate taxable gains and losses across organizational forms
to obtain the most favorable tax treatment. Thus aggregate net income will be a poor
indicator of the allocation of economic resources and activity across organizational forms.
For example, suppose that when assets yield losses they are best located in partnership
form, and then moved to corporate form when they yield gains. Then we would see low
or negative net income in the partnership sector, but it would be incorrect to infer that
the partnership sector represents a low (or negative!) fraction of economic resources or
economic activity.'6 We therefore examine net income (or deficit) separately for gain and
loss firms.
We present some descriptive statistics for our dataset in table 1. C corporations control
a dominant fraction of business assets in the U.S., and the variation in that share has been
relatively small over our sample period.'7 Pass-through organizations (i.e., not C corpo-
rations) account for a substantially larger share of losses than of gains. Partnerships and S
15 We had to remove the entire Industry 1-Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing-from all of our data,
leaving us only 7 of the 8 standard SIC industry aggregates, because some necessary farm information was
not reported by the IRS during the 1980s. See the appendix for details.
16 In fact, reported net income from all partnerships was negative from 1981 through 1986.
17 Sole proprietorships are not required to file balance sheets, and thus we are forced to exclude them
from calculations based on asset data. If we assume that sole proprietorships earn the same mean rate of
return on assets as do partnerships then sole proprietorships would have 15% of total assets in the economy
and the corporate share would fall to 80%. This is almost surely an overestimate for sole proprietorships.
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corporations seem to have been particularly biased towards loss activities. C corporations
controlled an asset base over 18 times larger than partnerships, yet reported on average
less than three times as much in losses. Viewed another way, the mean partnership share
of total losses was more than two times as large as the partnership share of gains.
The relatively small standard deviations indicate that there has not been a lot of net
asset mobility across organizational forms. The alocation of losses has been considerably
more volatile. The contrast between the allocation of total assets versus gains and losses
suggests that taxes indeed may have a significant effect on choice of organizational form.
Also, the apparent shifting of gains and losses emphasizes the importance of making that
distinction in the analysis.
Figure 1 presents the share of losses (for those firms with net losses) by organizational
form. There is substantially more variation in these time series than in the aggregate asset
data. There is also a very clear trend of shifting losses from C corporations to partnerships,
and also away from sole proprietorships.
How much movement should we have seen across organizational forms during our sam-
ple period due to tax changes? We focus on estimating the effects of changes in the average
value each year of the relative tax treatment of corporate vs. noncorporate income, as mea-
sured by r+ +(1 - re)T, - r. Any estimate of these relative tax rates will inevitably have
error. We deal with this by constructing four different series under different assumptions.
Some of the series are based on entirely different assumptions than each other, so we made
the further assumption that the sources of measurement error in these different series were
uncorrelated, allowing us to use one series as an instrument for another in instrumental
variables regressions. Our results are very robust to the choice of tax price series and
instruments.
Our series were constructed as follows. The measure of the corporate tax rate, T,
defined to equal the ratio of tax payments to taxable income, should take into account the
progressivity of the corporate tax rate structure, as well as the no-loss-offset provisions.1 8
18 As shown in Altshuler and Auerbach(1990), the tax code's asymmetric treatment of tax losses can
have a significant effect on the effective tax rate facing a firm.
In the results reported below, we tried two crude measures19 : the highest statutory
marginal rate in a given year, and the realized average tax rate in the IRS data (income
tax liability / taxable income). 20
For the personal tax rate on ordinary income (r-), we need a representative tax rate
for those potentially investing in noncorporate businesses. These are generally upper tax
bracket individuals. One approach to approximate this tax rate is to look at the represen-
tative tax rate on municipal bonds, another asset purchased primarily by those in upper
tax brackets. We use an estimate of this implicit tax rate calculated by Kochin and Parks
(1988) and Poterba (1989) by comparing the yields on Treasury and municipal bonds. We
also construct a r,, series using the highest statutory marginal personal tax rate in each
year.
To estimate the personal tax rate on equity income we assume that the fraction d of
nominal income accruing to equity holders takes the form of dividends, and that capital
gains are always realized long-term. Then rT = drai + (1 - d)garn where g measures the
fraction of long-term gains that are taxable, and a is an adjustment to make the capital
gains tax rate "accrual equivalent" to capture the benefits from deferring accruing tax
liabilities until the asset is sold plus the benefits from the capital gains tax exemption
on assets still held at death. Following Feldstein, Dicks-Mireaux, and Poterba (1983), we
assume that a = 0.25.21 We estimate d by taking the ratio of corporate dividend payments
19 In an earlier version of the paper we also used an effective marginal tax rate calculated by Auerbach
(1983). Although this measures improves on the statutory rate by adjusting for accelerated depreciation
and investment tax credits, it does not incorporate the value of asymmetric loss treatment. Our average
realized rate approximately accounts for all such provisions. Further, the Auerbach series ends in 1982.
For these reasons we only report results from using four tax price series, not six. However, the results
using the Auerbach series strongly confirmed our other results and thus emphasize the robustness of the
analysis.
20 We calculated the realized average tax rate based on taxes paid by all C corporations in the economy.
This measure should not be very correlated with the errors in the disaggregated industry time series on
the fraction of C corporation net income for gain and loss firms that is our dependent variable in many
of the regressions since each of the dependent variables represents only a small portion of the total tax
liability/taxable income ratio. In any case, our instrumental variables procedures ensure consistency of
our econometric estimates.
21 Recent research on optimal trading strategies suggests that the effects of the tax treatment of capital
gains may be far more complicated that what can be captured with an estimated a that is constant over
time. See Gordon and MacKie-Mason (1991) for further discussion.
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to after-tax corporate profits as reported in the National Income and Product Accounts.
We use the statutory time-series for the capital gains exclusion, 9.
With two different measures of both re and r. (the latter are used to construct two
corresponding measures of Te) we have a total of four different time-series measures of the
relative tax price on corporate assets. The series are shown in figure 2, and descriptive
statistics are given in table 2.22 The main difference between them is in scale; the group
that use the implicit bond price estimate of the personal tax rate show a much higher
tax price because those estimates are uniformly much lower than the alternative series
using the highest statutory personal marginal tax rate. However, we are interested more
in how the tax incentives have changed over time than in their levels. We always include
a time trend (and time squared) in our regressions; after removing these trends from the
tax price series all six are positively correlated (see table 2). In any case, we estimate all
of our regressions four times, using each series with appropriate instruments to check the
robustness of our results.
Figure 2 and table 2 also show us that there has been a substantial amount of time-
series variation in the tax incentives for different organizational forms. It is a truism in
the U.S. empirical public finance literature that one cannot estimate regressions using the
corporate tax rate because it has changed so little in the post-war era. However, the
tax price incentive for allocation of resources across organizational forms depends on the
personal tax rates on ordinary and equity income as well, causing the incentive to vary
substantially over time.
2.2 Tax Price Regressions
In order to test the degree to which there has been covariation between tax incentives and
the ownership structure, we estimated linear regressions of a measure of the allocation of
economic resources or activity on a constant, a time trend, time squared and one of the
four tax price measures. Our first results are given in table 3, for the fraction of assets in
C corporations, with a sample of all returns (assets are not separately available for gain
22 The labeling of the series in figure 4 is explained in table 2.
and loss firms for some organizational forms). We report only the tax price coefficient
from 12 different specifications, suppressing the constant and time trend coefficients. Each
row reports regressions using one of the four measures of the tax price; each column
represents a different estimation method. The measurement instrument for each equation
is the tax price series constructed with different assumptions than the series included as
an explanatory variable.2 3
The results are very clear and consistent. Regardless of the measure of the tax price,
the use of instruments or the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable, there is a negative
and in every case highly statistically significant relation between the tax price and the
fraction of assets held by C corporations. The mean t-statistics for the three different
methods (columns) are 4.15, 4.05, and 3.54. The higher is the tax disadvantage of C
corporate ownership, the lower is the fraction of assets held by corporations.2 4
The effects are not large, however. Using the mean of the IV estimates, -0.0502, cutting
T" (or raising rc + (1 - T)T) by .10 would lead to only a one-half of one percentage point
decrease in the fraction of assets held by C corporations. We also estimated the model
with a lagged dependent variable as a rough way to estimate the long-term adjustment
effect (this specification would arise from a Koyck adjustment lag process); based on the
mean of the estimates in the last column (and the mean of the coefficients on the lagged
dependent variable) the long run decrease in the C corporation asset share would still be
only 0.55 percentage points.
We report results from similar tax price regressions for disaggregated industries in table
4. Each row gives the mean tax price coefficients averaged over four regressions for each
industry listed, each regression using one of the different tax price measures.25 For this
23 For example, when the TP1 series (stat/stat) is an explanatory variable, we use TP4 (soi/boid) as
the instrument.
24 We undertook another test for the robustness of our estimates. The dependent variable as specified
has a limited range, since the fraction is bounded by definition between zero and one. We re-estimated
the equations using the log-odds ratio (In(y)/(1 - ln(y))) which ranges on the real line, with essentially
the same results for all four tax prices, using both OLS and IV. For ease of interpretation we report the
results in the paper with the dependent variable in fraction form.
25 Obviously the mean t-statistics reported cannot be used for strict hypothesis testing. Hlowever, when-
ever the mean is about two or larger the dispersion was small enough that each regression would yield
essentially equivalent inferences. The detailed results are available upon request.
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and all further analyses in the paper we report only results from instrumental variables
estimators.
Tax incentives have no statistically discernible effect on asset location for 5 of the 7
industries; only Mining and Financial show strong responses.26 Thus our conclusion at
this point is that in total there is very little shifting of assets in response to moderately
large tax incentive changes. However, the regressions reported thus far are based on the
sample of all firms, and do not allow for the possibility that there may be substantial flows
of gain and loss assets in opposite directions as tax incentives change, resulting in rather
small net effects.
Table 5 presents the results of our tax price regressions for the aggregate of all industries,
separated into firms with net gains and firms with net losses in each year. We again report
only the tax price coefficient from many different regressions; each row represents a different
tax price as the explanatory variable, with results from 8 regressions reported. Once again
the results are clear and consistent. Regardless of method or tax price variable, the fraction
of tax losses reported by C corporations significantly increases as the relative corporate
tax rate increases. As predicted, gains are allocated in the opposite direction, away from
corporations towards pass-through organizations as the corporate tax rate increases. All
of the t-statistics are very high.
The magnitude of income and loss shifting reported in table 5 is higher than that
estimated for assets in table 3. For example, at the mean for deficit firms, cutting T. by
.10 would lead to a short-run shift of about 6.2 percentage points. For gain firms the
corresponding shift would be about -5.5 percentage points.
The results are reinforced when we estimate the gain/loss regressions on disaggregated
industries, reported in table 6. Now we find that the pattern of shifting is very strong
and consistent across nearly all industries. We again report the mean results of four
different tax price regressions for each of seven industries, split by loss and gain firms.
There is a strong shift of taxable losses toward C corporations in every industry when the
relative tax on corporations rises (the effect is statistically insignificant at conventional
26 Given the dominant role in partnerships of the oil exploration and the real estate industries, which are
part of the Mining and Financial industries respectively, these results should not be surprising.
levels for Trade and Services). Taxable gains are shifted away from C corporations in five
industries (although with high statistical significance in only one); the shift is close to
zero in Transportation, and is significantly positive for Financial, which is one of the only
unexpected results in all of our analyses. Although the effects are mostly consistent and
for losses quite statistically significant, the magnitudes are not very large.
We noted in section 2 that we might be able to control for some of the non-tax in-
fluences on choice of organizational form by comparing C and S corporations, since both
are corporations and share many similar characteristics (including limited liability). We
estimated the share of assets, gains and losses held by C corporations relative to the com-
bined asset base of C and S corporations and report the results in table 7. It turns out
that the shifting of assets in the aggregate is due entirely to shifts towards partnerships,
not S corporations; the tax cost of C corporation ownership seems to have had no effect
on the allocation of total assets between C and S corporations.
However, gains and losses move very significantly between C and S corporations, in
the direction predicted. Since the distinction between C and S corporations more directly
focuses on tax rules than other factors these results provide strong support for our overall
conclusions.
In table 8 we report the results of tax price regressions for number of returns filed by
gain and loss firms, for the all-industry aggregate. Of course, this measure is meaningful
only to the extent that the size of the average firm filing a return does not systematically
change in response to the tax price incentives. Although not a perfect measure, though, the
number of returns can be used to test the robustness of our findings. The results support
our findings above for loss firms, but they are indeterminate for gain firms. We report
regressions for the fraction of C corporation returns versus S corporations alone, and versus
all pass-through forms combined (S corporations, partnerships and sole proprietorships).
The fraction of C corporation returns for loss firms increases as the relative corporate tax
rate increases, with high t-statistics for the shift between C and S corporations.
Altogether we have found very strong evidence that both assets and annual gains and
losses are shifted across organizational forms in response to changes in the relative tax costs
imposed on those forms. It seems safe to conjecture that the evidence for asset shifting
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would be even stronger if we could distinguish between the assets of gain and loss firms,
since the incentives go in opposition directions for those groups. The magnitudes of the
effects are measured very consistently across a wide variety of models using different defini-
tions of the tax price, both OLS and IV estimation, aggregate and industry-disaggregated
data, and to a lesser extent, when looking at the number of returns as an alternative inea-
sure of economic activity. The effects are very statistically significant, but appear to be
rather small.
2.3 Other Tax Factors
In section 1.2 we discussed a number of other tax rules that can affect the incentive to
locate assets in particular organizational forms, but that are difficult to summarize in a
measure of the tax rate incentive. In this section we report the results of our efforts to
determine whether some non-tax-rate changes in tax rules had significant effects on the
allocation of economic resources and activities across organizational forms.
We have developed a chronology of significant tax policy changes between 1958 and
1986 that we believe may have affected the choice of organizational form without directly
affecting one of our tax rate variables.27 From a long list of changes (in nearly every year)
we have selected 4 years in which the changes seem to have a strong and clear impact on the
direction of the tax incentives, and a 5th year in which the changes were clearly important
but had effects in two directions making it difficult to predict ex ante the magnitude or
direction of the effects. We briefly describe these policy changes in table 9. Most of the
changes concern rules for S corporations, so we provide our prediction of the changes in
the fraction of activity in C corporations relative to S corporations, and in the fraction of
S corporate activity to all pass-through organizations.28 Because S corporations were first
27 We are grateful to Linda Burilovich for her excellent assistance in preparing this chronology.
28
Most of the changes should be self-explanatory, or were explained in section 1.2 of the paper. One
exception is the debt reclassification relaxation for S corporations in 1973. When corporations-C or S-
borrow substantial sums from their shareholders, there is a risk that the IRS will deem those loans to be
the taxable equivalent of non-voting equity shares, thereby ruling the "interest" payments to be dividends
and ineligible for the interest deduction. Since S corporations were allowed to have only one class of stock,
debt reclassification could make a corporation ineligible for S status. Since the interest payments were
taxable to the shareholders at the same tax rates as pass-through equity earnings, the IRS essentially
stopped debt reclassifications for S corps in 1973, making S status more viable for many firms.
permitted in 1957, we study the effect of these rule changes only for the period 1965-1986
to avoid the problems of the "start-up" transition towards S corporations.29
Most of the changes were liberalizations of the restrictions on S corporations, so we
expect a shift of resources and activity away from C and toward S corporations. The
changes in 1983 both liberalized and further restricted S corporations, so we expect the
effects to be ambiguous.30
We tested for the effects of these policy changes on the allocation of assets and income
by extending our tax price regressions reported above. Our basic model was to use three-
stage least squares to estimate a system of tax price regressions across the seven industry
disaggregates, allowing all of the coefficients to vary by industry as in the regressions
reported in tables 4 and 6 above. We added dummy variables as intercept shifts for the
policy changes; to obtain sufficient degrees of freedom we restricted the policy dummy
coefficients to be the same across all 7 industry equations. Since the policy changes were
permanent, the dummies were coded to be one for all years subsequent to the initial
year, and zero for all years before. Thus each coefficient estimate represents the average
permanent change in the dependent variable following the policy change.
The results are reported in tables 10 and 11. The dependent variables in table 10 are
the fractions of C corporate assets, income and losses relative to S corporations; in table
11 the dependent variables are the S corporation fractions relative to partnerships and
sole proprietorships. In each table we report the tax policy dummy variable estimates for
the fraction of assets (all returns), the fraction of net income (returns with positive net
income) and the fraction of losses (returns with losses), estimated once with TP1 and once
with TP4 as the explanatory tax price variable. Thus, each table reports coefficients from
six different system regressions.
The results are clear and consistent across specifications. The policy changes in 1969,
1982 and to a lesser extent 1976 had the predicted effects on the allocation of assets, income
29 Graphical analysis of the data suggested that the startup transition ran from about 1957-1964. Our
time-period dummy estimates are quite sensitive to the presence of this secular trend in the early years.
30 The various changes we study all have the flavor of raising or lowering barriers to entry, all else
constant. Thus, the predicted effects are the same for both gain and loss firms: when S corporation rules
are liberalized, more activity of both sorts should move to S corporate form.
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and deficits between C and S corporations, with strong statistical significance. The debt
reclassification relaxation for S corporations in 1973 seems to have had no discernible effect.
The 1983 mix of changes shifted taxable gains towards S corporations, but had no effect on
assets or losses. It is not clear why only the allocation of gains should have been affected;
if anything, we expected the allocation of deficits to be more affected by the unlimited
flow-through loss carryover granted to S corporations.
The results for S corporations versus partnerships and sole proprietorships are similar,
but somewhat weaker. Both 1969 and 1982 show the predicted effect with strong statistical
significance. No clear pattern is demonstrated for either 1973 or 1976; the two statistically
significant estimates for 1973 have the predicted sign, but the evidence for 1976 tends
weakly against the prediction. The 1983 mix of policies seemed to have zero net effects.
The allocation of assets, gains, and losses across organizational forms responded as
predicted to these important changes in the rules. However, all of the estimated effects
were rather small.
2.4 The U.S. 1986 Tax Reform Act
The U.S. 1986 Tax Reform Act probably contained the most important changes in both
tax rate and other tax incentives for the choice of organizational form during our entire
sample period. Unfortunately, corporate income tax data for 1987 and 1988 have not been
released by the IRS as of this writing, and we are thus unable to do a thorough analysis
of impact of this law. None of the results reported thus far in the paper reflect any data
after 1986. However, we have been able to obtain some information that suggests large
shifts across organizational forms after 1986.31
The most obvious change is that the personal tax rate was cut by more than the
corporate rate, and in fact the top personal marginal tax rate was lower than the corporate
rate for the first time in the modern era. This will raise the relative tax price on the C
corporate form and should have induced profitable assets to move towards pass-through
forms. Another important change was the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine for
3 For a more complete discussion, see Gordon and MacKie-Mason (1991).
corporations, which was an important vehicle for avoiding a double capital gains tax on
asset sales. The tough new alternative minimum tax on C corporations should also have
shifted activity. On the other hand, passive loss restrictions and the higher floors on
allowable personal deductions for medical and other expenses are unfavorable to pass--
through organizations.
One observation possible with data currently available is that there was a huge surge
in the number of corporations filing to obtain S status. During the first six months of 1987
there were about 375,000 filings, compared to an average six-month rate of about 150,000
during 1983-1986. The filing rate has continued to be higher than before for each half year
through 1988.
Another striking fact concerns the aggregate net income reported by S corporations
and partnerships. From 1981 to 1986 this net income averaged -$2.2 billion. In 1987
net income jumped to positive $32 billion. This is consistent with the elimination of any
investors with personal tax rates exceeding the effective tax rate on corporate income --
with a relatively higher corporate tax cost income should be shifted towards pass-through
organizations and losses should move towards C corporations.
3. Conclusion
Our basic hypothesis is simple: taxes should induce profitable firms to shift out of the
corporate sector when the tax distortion to incorporating is larger, and conversely for
firms with tax losses. We presented a model showing how the choice of organizational
form depends on the relative tax treatment of corporate and noncorporate firms. We also
identified a number of tax policy features that are important for the choice of organizational
form but which could not be summarized in an observable tax price measure, and discussed
non-tax factors that may affect the choice of organizational form.
Our empirical evidence is quite strong and consistent: assets, taxable gains and taxable
losses all shift across organizational forms in response to changes in tax rate and other tax
policy incentives. We tested a wide variety of specifications using different measures of
the tax incentives, different forms of the dependent variable, and different econometric
methods, and throughout obtained highly statistically significant estimates that support
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the basic hypothesis. We also found that some of the major non-tax-rate policy changes
that we identified caused significant shifts in the predicted directions between C and S
corporations, and between S corporations, partnerships and proprietorships. Some of the
policy changes seemed to have no effect, but none that we tested had consistently signficant
effects that contradicted our predictions.
All measured effects are small, however, throwing doubt on the economic importance
of tax-induced changes in organizational form. We have not yet estimated the magnitude
of the excess burden implied by our estimates. But we do not see the dramatic shifts of
resources in response to tax rate changes that we would expect if choice of organizational
form were a simple arbitrage in a frictionless environment. It appears that transactions
costs and non-tax factors affecting the choice of organizational form are important.
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Table 1: Assets, Income and Losses By Organizational Form
Billion 1982 Dollars, 1959-1986
- Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Assets, all returns
Total Assets 8050.6 2744.2 3994.2 15052.2
% C corporation 93.8% 2.1% 89.5% 96.2%
% S corporation 1.10/0 0.2% 0.6% 1.6%
% partnership 5.1% 2.0% 3.1% 8.9%
Income, firms with net income
Total Income 405.4 84.0 264.4 574.6
% C corporation 66.9% 3.6% 61.9% 76.0%
% S corporation 2.10/0 0.8% 0.7% 3.9%
% partnership 10.1% 1.9% 6.0% 14.0%
% sole proprietorship 20.8% 3.4% 16.0% 25.5%
Loss, firms with loss
Total Loss 65.5 65.9 24.0 243.0
% C corporation 57.9% 7.5% 44.7% 70.1%
% S corporation 4.6% 1.0% 2.7% 7.9%
% partnership 22.9% 9.8% 9.1% 37.6%
% sole proprietorship 14.6% 3.8% 7.7% 22.1%
Source: IRS Statistics of income publications.
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics on Tax Price Variables, 1959-1986
Series Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
TP1 -2.6% 8.9% -17.7% 17.7%
TP2 -3.5% 10.7% -20.1% 24.3%
TP3 31.9% 5.5% 20.7% 41.1%
TP4 30.6% 7.0% 18.0% 47.0%

















Detrended tax prices calculated as residuals from regressions

















Statutory = highest marginal statutory rate
Statistics of Income = realized average tax rate for all returns,
IRS Statistics of Income
Bond Prices = implicit personal tax rate from bond prices,
Kochin and Parks (1968) and Poterba (1989)
Table 3 Table 4
Estimated Tax Price Effects on the Fraction of Assets Held By C Corporations Estimated Tax Price Effects on the Fraction of Assets Held by C Corporations
by Industry




Tax price OLS IV Dependent Variable
TP1: stat/stat -0.0312 -0.0678 -0.0553
(2.97) (4.17) (4.15)
TP2: sol/stat -0.0268 -0.0523 -0.0433
(3.74) (3.63) (3.14)
TP3: stat/bond -0.0427 -0.0498 -0.0394
(4.84) (4.54) (3.40)
TP4: soi/bond -0.0292 -0.0308 -0.0215
(5.06) (3.89) (3.47)
Means -0.0325 -0.0502 -0.0399
(4.15) (4.05) (3.54)
Notes:
1. t-statistics based on White's heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors are in parentheses
2. Each reported coefficient is the tax price coefficient from a different regression (12 regressions are
reported in this table). The dependent variable was the fraction of assets held in the C corporation form.
The other explanatory variables were a constant, a time trend and time squared.
"Means" are the arithmetic means of the coefficients and t-statistics in the column above.
3. Tax price variables are identified by the source used to obtain the marginal tax rate for corporations/
individuals (respectively). "stat'= statutory; "sol" = average tax rate based on SO data
(federal income tax / net pre-tax income); "bond" = bond price implicit personal tax rate from
Kochin and Parks (1988) and Poterba (1989).






















Aggregate (from Table 3) -0.0502
(4.05)
Notes:
1. t-statistics based on White's heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors are in parentheses.
Each column was estimated by instrumental variables.
2. Each reported coefficient isthe mean tax price coefficient from different regressions
using the four tax price variables defined in the text. Thus, coefficients from
32 regressions are summarized in this table. The other explanatory variables in
each regression were a constant, a time trend and time squared.
3. All regressions based on 27 observations, 1959-1986 (partnership assets not available for 1960).
Table 5 Table 6
Estimated Tax Price Effects on the Fraction of Gains and Losses
Reported by C Corporations
All firms (aggregated) except agriculture, forestry, fishing
Tax price Deficit Firms Gain Firms
TP1: stat/stat 0.776 -0.721
(3.26) (3.09)
TP2: soi/stat 0.463 -0.560
(2.71) (3.60)
TP3: stat/bond 0.767 -0.548
(3.56) (4.73)





1. t-statistics based on White's heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors are In parentheses
2. Each reported coefficient Is the tax price coefficient from a different regression (8 regressions are
reported in this table). The other explanatory variables were a constant, a time trend and time squared.
Each regression estimated with instrumental variables.
3. Tax price variables are Identified by the source used to obtain the marginal tax rate for corporations/
individuals (respectively). 'stat' = statutory; 'sol" = average realized tax rate based on
SOI data (federal Income tax / net pre-tax Income); 'bond' = bond price Implicit personal tax rate
from Kochin and Parks (1988) and Poterba (1989).
4. All regressions based on 28 observations, 1959-1986.
Estimated Tax Price Effects on Fraction of Gains and Losses
Reported by C Corporations
Results by Industry, for Deficit and Gain firms
















(from Table 5) (3.25) (3.70)
Notes:
1. t-statistics based on White's heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors are in parentheses.
2. Each entry in the table is the mean from four regressions using the four different tax price variables
(64 regressions are summmarized in this table). The other explanatory variables were a constant, a time trend
and time squared.
3. Tax price variables are identified by the source used to obtain the marginal tax rate for corporations/
individuals (respectively). 'stat' = statutory; 'soi' = average realized tax rate based on SOl data (federal
income tax / net pre-tax income); 'bond' = bond price implicit personal tax rate from Kochin and Parks
(1988) and Poterba (1989).
4. All regressions based on 28 observations, 1959-1986. All regressions estimated with instrumental variables.
Table 7 Table 8
Estimated Tax Effects on the Allocation of Assets, Income and Losses
Between C and S Corporations
All firms (aggregated) except agriculture, forestry and fishing
Tax Price Assets Losses Gains
TP1: stat/stat -0.00087 0.361 -0.0953
(0.0920) (5.94) (2.03)
TP3: sol/stat -0.00405 0.244 -0.0825
(0.664) (5.59) (2.65)
TP4: stat/bond -0.00532 0.291 -0.1
(0.492) (4.54) (2.44)
TP6: soi/bond -0.00734 0.165 -0.079
(0.885) (4.83) (2.13)
Means -0.00439 0.265 -0.0893
(0.533) (5.23) (2.31)
Notes:
1. t-statistics based on White's heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors are in parentheses.
2. Each reported coefficient is the tax price coefficient from a different regression (12 regressions are
reported in this table). The other explanatory variables were a constant, a time trend and time squared.
Each regression was estimated with instrumental variables.
3. Tax price variables are identified by the source used to obtain the marginal tax rate for corporations/
individuals (respectively). 'stat*- statutory; "soi' = average realized tax rate based on SOl data (federal
income tax / net pre-tax income); 'bond' = bond price implicit personal tax rate from Kochin and Parks
(1988) and Poterba (1989).
Estimated Tax Price Effects on the Fraction of Returns Filed By C Corporations
C corps vs. others; C corps vs. S corps
All firms (aggregated) except agriculture, forestry and fishing
Deficit Firms Gain Firms
C corps C corps C corps C corps
Tax price vs. other vs. S corps vs. other vs. S corps
TP1: stat/stat 0.0625 0.196 0.00774 0.0550
(1.06) (4.48) (0.253) (0.865)
TP3: sol/stat 0.0315 0.141 -0.0133 0.0129
(0.606) (4.06) (0.634) (0.305)
TP4: stat/bond 0.13 0.156 0.0343 0.0524
(2.43) (3.7) (0.978) (0.671)
TP6: sol/bond 0.1 0.0929 0.0170 0.0135
(2.02) (3.91) (0.791) (0.281)
Means 0.081 0.146475 0.247 0.0335
(1.53) (4.04) (0.664) (0.531)
Notes:
1. t-statistics based on White's heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors are in parentheses.
2. Each reported coefficient is the tax price coefficient from a different regression (16 regressions are
reported in this table). The other explanatory variables were a constant, a time trend and time squared.
Each regression estimated with instrumental variables.
3. Tax price variables are identified by the source used to obtain the marginal tax rate for corporations/
individuals (respectively). 'stat' - statutory;'sol' - average realized tax rate based on Sol data (federal
income tax / net pre-tax income); 'bond' = bond price implicit personal tax rate from Kochin and Parks
(1988) and Poterba (1989).
4. All regressions based on 28 observations, 1959-1986.
4. All regressions based on 28 observations, 1959-1986.
Table 9 Table 10
Major Non-Rate Tax Policy Changes
Expected Effect on:
Year Changes (C-+SC) (SC + P + SP)
1969 S corps allowed to use Keogh-like qualified pension
plans, putting them on parity with partnerships and
sole proprietorships
1973 Debt reclassification restriction on S corps almost
completely relaxed
1976 At-risk rules implemented, primarily for partnerships
1962 (a) New S corps cannot own subsidiaries: (b) Umit
on S corp shareholders raised to 20; (c) limit removed
on S corporation foreign income: (d) limit removed
on S corporation passive income; (e) C corporation loss
carryforward extended from 7 to 15 years
1983 (a) S corps restored to pension plan parity with C
corps; (b) S corp shareholder limit raised to 35;
(c) S corps granted unlimited flow-through loss




Estimated Non-Rate Tax Policy Changes on Fraction of Assets and Income
C Corporations versus S Corporations
Model 1969 1973 1976 1982 1983
Assets (all firms)
stat/stat -0.00469 -0.00114 0.00516 -0.0155 -0.000674
(2.65) (0.833) (3.26) (3.19) (0.243)
soi/bond -0.00795 0.0024 0.00594 -0.00721 -0.0014
(4.21) (1.26) (4.18) (2.71) (0.623)
Income (gain firms)
stat/stat -0.0149 0.0071 0.00859 -0.0247 -0.0153
(3.29) (0.489) (2.12) (1.98) (2.15)
sol/bond -0.0172 0.00532 0.00966 -0.0159 -0.0155
(3.32) (1.02) (2.47) (2.17) (2.52)
Deficit (loss firms)
stat/stat -0.00361 -0.0147 0.00489 -0.0825 0.022
(.259) (1.37) (0.393) (2.16) (1.01)
soi/bond -0.0201 0.0183 -0.00509 -0.0313 0.0100
(2.70) (2.43) (0.909) (2.98) (1.20)
Notes:
1. I-statistics based on White's heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors are in parentheses.
2. Each row reports just the coefficients on the tax policy change dummy variables tor a single regression (6 regressions
are reported in this table). The tax price used as an explanatory variable is Indicated in the left column.
The other explanatory variables were a constant, a time trend and time squared.
3. Tax price variables are identified by the source used to obtain the marginal tax rate for corporations/
individuals (respectively). 'stat' - statutory;'etr* - Auerbach's (1983) corporate effective tax rates; 'soi'
average tax rate based on SO data (federal Income tax / net pre-tax income): 'bond' = bond price implicit
personal tax rate from Kochin and Parks (1988) and Poterba (1989).
4. All regressions based on 154 observations for seven Industries over 1965-1986. Models were estimated using 3SLS
equations, with equality restrictions imposed on the tax policy change dummies across the equations. TP4 was used
as the Instrument for TP1, and TP1 was used as the Instrument for TP4.
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Table 11
Estimated Non-Rate Tax Policy Changes on Fraction of Assets and Income
S Corporations versus Partnerships and Sole Proprietorships
Model 1969 1973 1976 1982 1983
Assets (all firms)
stat/stat 0.0291 0.0258 -0.0114 0.0645 0.0228
(2.31) (2.65) (1.01) (1.86) (1.15)
sol/bond 0.0604 -0.00707 -0.0166 0.0579 0.00218
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soi/bond 0.0392 -0.00648 -0.0157 0.0621 0.00361
(3.88) (0.635) (2.06) (4.36) (0.301)
Deficit (loss firms)
stat/stat 0.0148 0.00169 -0.00358 0.0175 0.00388
(1.19) (0.176) (.0323) (0.515) (0.200)
soil/bond 0.0139 -0.00606 -0.00447 -0.00394 0.00758
(1.18) (0.513) (0.507) (0.239) (0.546)
Notes:
1. t-statistics based on White's heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors are in parentheses.
2. Each row reports just the coefficients on the tax policy change dummy variables for a single regression (6 regressions
are reported In this table). The tax price used as an explanatory variable Is Indicated in the left column.
The other explanatory variables were a constant, a time trend and time squared.
3. Tax price variables are Identified by the source used to obtain the marginal tax rate for corporations/
Individuals (respectively). *stat* - statutory; 'etr' - Auerbach's (1983) corporate effective tax rates; 'soi"
average tax rate based on So0 data (federal income tax / net pre-tax Income); 'bond' = bond price implicit
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